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Abstract
This paper considers whether the ratio of transfer payments to
expenditure on public goods in democracies can be explained as the
outcome of majority voting. A simple model is constructed in which
individuals vote for government expenditure on a public good, for a
given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by
the government’s budget constraint. The equilibrium ratio of trans-
fers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a quadratic
function both of the ratio of the median to the mean wage, and of
the tax rate. Data for 29 democratic countries are used to estimate a
cross-sectional regression. The empirical results conﬁrm that reduc-
tions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with
reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure,
at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from
relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative im-
portance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax
rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public
goods.
∗We are grateful to Shuyun May Li for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
11 Introduction
T h ea i mo ft h i sp a p e ri st oe x p l o r et h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h ec o m p o s i t i o n
of government expenditure in democracies can be explained as the outcome
of majority voting. Special attention is given to the division between ex-
penditure on public goods and on transfer payments. In order to guide the
speciﬁcation of a relationship that can be estimated using information on a
cross section of democratic countries, a simple model is constructed in which
individuals with similar preferences, but diﬀering abilities and thus wages,
vote for government expenditure on a public good. The choice is made con-
ditional on the tax rate in a proportional income tax.1 Hence voting is over
only one dimension and a majority voting equilibrium is known to exist if
certain well-known conditions apply.2 The resulting level of a transfer pay-
ment, in the form of a basic income, is given by the government’s budget
constraint. The framework of analysis is entirely static, so that current gov-
ernment expenditure is ﬁnanced only by current tax revenue. Despite the
simplicity of the model, it is seen to provide useful insights into the various
relationships involved in voting over the composition of expenditure.
The analysis contrasts with earlier studies which have tended to con-
centrate on the majority choice of transfer payments, and thus on the rela-
tionship between fundamental inequality in the wage rate distribution and
desired redistribution of net income achieved through a tax and transfer sys-
tem.3 In those models, the redistribution usually arises entirely from the
self-interest of voters who balance the desire for a higher transfer payment
1Bearse et al. (2001), who examine majority voting over a uniform transfer and public
education, also assume that the tax rate is given exogenously. Tridimias and Winer (2005)
consider voting over only tax-ﬁnanced public goods. On diﬃculties raised by multidimen-
tional voting, see Muller (2003, pp. 87-92). However, Appendix C considers the choice of
tax rate in a two-stage framework.
2These include single-peakedness of preferences or agent monotonicity, whereby the
rankings of individuals are not aﬀected by the tax structure: see Roberts (1977).
3A large literature is associated with the Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer-
Richard (1981) framework involving majority voting over a linear tax. On voting over
redistributive taxation see also Krusell et al. (1999) and Azzimonti et al. (2006). See
also the survey by Borck (2007), who gives special attention to models which modify the
extent to which inequality may lead to a majority equilibrium involving higher taxation
(and thus redistribution via a transfer payment).
2against the limits on the government’s ability to redistribute income, which
are imposed by labour supply incentive eﬀects.4 In the present model, the
existence of expenditure on public goods, which aﬀects individuals’ utility
directly, creates a further trade-oﬀ. The beneﬁts of higher transfer payments,
which (via individuals’ budget constraints) allow the consumption of more
goods and leisure, are balanced against the desire for public goods which
enter utility functions but are subject to a tax price rather than a consumer
price. In addition, the present analysis considers the potential eﬀects of an
altruistic desire for redistribution on the part of voters.
The basic model and framework of analysis are described in Section 2,
which derives the indirect utility function of each individual, expressed in
terms of expenditure on the public good and the given tax rate. Section 3
shows that the conditions for a majority voting equilibrium are satisﬁed, and
generates closed-form solutions for public good expenditure and the implied
transfer payment. The solutions depend on the ratio of median to arithmetic
mean wage rates. The potential eﬀects of an aversion on the part of voters
for inequality in the distribution of net income are investigated in Section 4.
Section 5 reports numerical examples. In particular the relationship between
the composition of expenditure and the ratio of the median to the average
wage rate, and the income tax rate, are investigated. The numerical examples
are useful in view of the high degree of nonlinearity involved in the analyti-
cal expressions, so that the relationships are not transparent. Furthermore,
the numerical examples demonstrate relatively little sensitivity of the voting
equilibrium composition of expenditure in relation to inequality aversion on
the part of voters. The results of Section 5 are then used to guide the empir-
ical work of Section 6. The construction of a special cross-sectional dataset
for 29 democratic countries, along with estimation of the ratio of median to
arithmetic mean wage rates, is described. The resulting regression analyses
provide tentative support for the model. Conclusions are in Section 7.
4In the standard linear tax model, the majority voting equilibrium is characterised by
equality between the elasticity of average (gross) earnings with respect to the tax rate
and a measure of inequality of earnings (equal to 1 minus the ratio of median earnings to
average earnings). This result is a straightforward modiﬁcation of the optimal tax result
obtained by Tuomala (1985).
32 The Basic Model
This section derives individuals’ preferences for public good expenditure,
given the income tax rate. The direct utility function and optimal consump-
tion and labour supply, for an individual who faces a given wage rate and tax
rate and receives a non means-tested transfer payment, or basic income, are
examined in subsection 2.1. The government budget constraint, derived in
subsection 2.2, means that a degree of freedom in policy choices is lost and
the value of the unconditional transfer payment is determined for a given
tax rate and level of public good provision. Hence, as shown in subsection
2.3, the indirect utility function can be expressed in terms of public good
expenditure and the tax rate in this static model.5 Earnings are the only
source of income and tax revenue is devoted only to the provision of the pure
public good and the transfer payment.
2.1 Individual Consumption and Labour Supply
Each individual is assumed to derive utility from consumption, c,l e i s u r e ,
h, and the public good, G.B y d e ﬁnition all individuals consume the same
amount of the public good which must be tax-ﬁnanced. The direct utility






Suppose that individuals have similar preferences but diﬀerent productiv-
ities and therefore wage rates, w. Although all individuals consume the same
amount of the public good, they do not receive the same beneﬁts: higher wage
individuals experience higher marginal utility. The model has the property of
‘hierarchical adherence’ (or ‘agent monotonicity’), so that the tax rate does
not aﬀect the ranking of individuals by income. High wage individuals are
consistently better oﬀ in terms of utility, so there is incentive compatibility.
5The model therefore ignores the eﬀect of government policies on saving. In a dynamic
context, complexities can arise from changes in the identity of the median voter and inter-
generational conﬂict, commitment and time consistency. On dynamic voting models, see
Krusell et al. (1999), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Hassler et al. (2005), Azzimonti et al.
(2006) and Hassler et al. (2007).
4T h ec h o i c eo fG is not determined at the individual level, since individ-
uals cannot be excluded, but is determined along with the tax system via
a democratic process. The price of the consumption good is normalised to
unity, so that consumption and net earnings are equal. Suppose there is an
unconditional and untaxed transfer payment of b per individual. There is a
simple proportional income tax, with the rate, t, so that the price of leisure
is w(1 − t). Therefore the form of individual’s budget constraint is:
c = w(1 − h)(1 − t)+b (2)
The transfer payment per person is restricted to be positive, so that, for
example, public goods expenditure cannot be ﬁnanced from a poll tax.6
Deﬁnd full income, M, as the net income obtained if all the individual’s
endowment of one unit of time is devoted to work, so that:
M = w(1 − t)+b (3)
The budget constraint can thus be expressed as:
c + hw(1 − t)=M (4)
Using the standard properties of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the de-



















Where h<1, that is the individual works, if the wage rate exceeds a thresh-









6Borge and Rattsø (2004), in contrast, examine the ﬁnance of ‘public services’ using a
combination of a progressive property tax and a regressive poll tax. However, they do not
consider income taxes and thus do not allow for labour supply variations.
5Consequently, gross earnings, y, of workers are given by:
y = w(1 − h)






a n da r eal i n e a rf u n c t i o no ft h ew a g er a t e .
2.2 The Government Budget Constraint
The government budget constraint requires that total revenue from the pro-
portional income tax, equal to t
Pn
i=1 yi for a population of n individuals,






where y denotes arithmetic mean earnings. The analysis is simpliﬁed by the
assumption that wi >w min for all individuals, implying that everyone works:
see Appendix A which discusses the relaxation of this assumption. Average
income, since individuals have similar preferences, is therefore:






where w denotes the arithmetic mean wage rate. By substituting (10) in (9),











The indirect utility function, V , is obtained by substituting the solutions for



























Substituting (11) into (3), gives full income in terms of G as:


















and substituting this expression into (12), V can be expressed in terms of
the two policy variables t and G, the arithmetic mean wage rate in relation
to the individual’s wage rate, and preference parameters.
3 Collective Choice
This section examines policy decision regarding the composition of expendi-
ture — the transfer payment relative to public good expenditure per person —
in the case where choices are based on the majority voting outcome.7 Individ-
u a l sa r et h u sa s s u m e dt oh a v es u ﬃcient information about the government’s
budget constraint so that the full implications for b of any policy choice of t
and G are known.
Voting is assume to concern the level of G for a given tax rate t,s ot h a t
one dimension only is involved.8 It is well-known that a majority voting
equilibrium exists, in which the median voter dominates, if all individuals
have single-peaked preferences. In the present context this is guaranteed if
the relationship between V and G is concave for all individuals, so that:
∂2V
∂G2 < 0 (16)
7Hence, the present approach does not allow for the types of modiﬁcation to the voting
model which reduce the extent to which inequality may lead to redistributive outcomes
in the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard framework. These are surveyed by Harms and
Zink (2003) and Borck (2007). Tridimas and Winer (2005) emphasise the role of political
inﬂuence and thus the ‘supply side’ of government.
8Appendix C examines the case where eﬀectively a two-stage voting procedure is used,
in which individuals vote over the tax rate, knowing the outcome of a resulting vote over
government expenditure on public goods.
7By diﬀerentiating (12) twice with respect to G, it is possible to show that this
r e q u i r e m e n ti ss a t i s ﬁed for all individuals. Hence the choice of G, for given t,
is based on the preferences of the median voter which, in the present model,
are distinguished from other voters only because of the median voter’s wage
rate. The median voter is therefore the individual with median wage. Letting
an m subscript refer to the median voter, Vm is obtained by substitution













































=( 1− α − β) (19)
which, after some manipulation, can be solved to give Gm/n as:
Gm
n
=( 1− α − β){wm + t(1 − β
0)(w − wm)} (20)
and the resulting value of bm is given by appropriate substitution into (11).
These values apply for positive values of the social transfer, so the given tax













1 − (α + β)
¶¸−1
(21)
Even for a symmetric distribution of wage rates, it can be shown that bm > 0
if t>(1 − α − β)(α + β)/α. Hence, with suﬃcient revenue the median
9In addition, the tax rate is also subject to an upper limit, given the assumption that
all individuals work, so that for sensible values the social transfer must remain suﬃciently
below the minimum wage.
8voter would prefer some redistributive transfer payments in addition to the
tax ﬁnanced public good.
The focus here is on the ratio of the transfer payment to the expenditure
on the public good per person, rather than absolute values. It can be shown
that this ratio, R = bm/(Gm/n),i sg i v e nb y :
R =
1 − t



















This result shows that the ratio of the transfer payment to public goods
expenditure per person depends, among other things, on the ratio of median
wage rate to average wage rate. In a positively skewed distribution this
latter ratio is of course less than unity. In other words the composition of
government expenditure is determined by the skewness of the distribution
of wage rates. For example, any growth in productivity, with no change in
skewness, has no direct eﬀect on the majority choice of the composition of
expenditure.
The expression in (22) is highly nonlinear in wm/¯ w and t. Hence, in order
to obtain further insights to help produce a speciﬁcation that is useful for
empirical work, it is useful to examine its properties further. First, it can be
shown that:
∂2R
∂t2 < 0 (23)
so that there is a concave relationship between R and t.T h e ﬁrst deriva-
tive ∂R/∂t is positive for low values of t and negative for relatively higher
values. This is dominated by the concave relationship between bm and t,
since ∂Gm/∂t is positive, while ∂2Gm/∂t2 =0for all relevant values of t.
The concavity of R with respect to t is therefore strongly aﬀected by the
labour supply eﬀects of taxes and transfers. The median voter, while being
below the average income and thus desiring some redistribution, prefers to
see expenditure on the public good increase steadily as t increases, despite
its decreasing marginal utility.
The above result in (22) shows that the majority choice of the composition
of expenditure depends only on the ratio of median to average wage rates,
9so that the absolute levels (or units of measurement) are not relevant.10 An
increasing in the ratio of the median wage to the average wage (where the
former is less than the latter) implies that the positive skewness, and hence
degree of inequality, of the distribution decreases.11 The relationship between















(1 − α − β)
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This result shows that more equality reduces R, and higher inequality
(less equality) causes government expenditure to move towards relatively
larger transfer payments, compared with expenditure on public goods.
The partial derivatives ∂ (G/n)/∂ (w) and ∂ (b)/∂ (w) are both positive
so that an upward shift in the distribution of wage rates unambiguously
increases the majority choice of total expenditure, for a given tax rate. An
increase in the average wage rate, with an unchanged median, clearly reduces
wm/w and therefore increases inequality, leading to an increase in relative
and absolute expenditure on the transfer payment, while also increasing ex-
penditure on the public good.
The partial derivatives ∂ (G/n)/∂ (wm) and ∂ (b)/∂ (wm) are positive and
negative respectively. Hence a increase in the median wage rate (with an
unchanged arithmetic mean wage) has a positive eﬀect on public goods and
total expenditure, but reduces the absolute social transfer and the ratio of
the transfer to public good expenditure. The latter can be seen from (24)
and the fact than an increasing median reduces inequality.
10However, the absolute values are clearly aﬀected by shifts in the distribution of wage
rates.
11Strictly inequality and skewness refer to diﬀerent concepts. However, in the context
of positively skewed distributions, they are closely related: for example in lognormal dis-
tribuions, both depend only on the variance of logarithms. It is standard in the literature
on voting models to refer to the ratio of median to mean income in terms of inequality.
104V o t e r s C a r e A b o u t I n e q u a l i t y
This section considers how majority voting outcomes may change when indi-
viduals care about the inequality of net income. To simplify the analysis it is
assumed that individual labour supply and consumption decisions continue
to be made selﬁshly according to the maximization of U = cahβG1−α−β as
above. This means that the expressions for optimal values of c and h,a l o n g
with the form of the government budget constraint, are unchanged. However,
equality matters when individuals vote over the level of public good expen-
diture.12 Suppose the indirect utility function is augmented by an additive
term containing the coeﬃcient of variation of net income. For instance, the







1−α−β − λ(1 + ηz)
ξ (25)
where ηz is the coeﬃcient variation of net income. In this form of indirect
utility function, λ and ξ reﬂect the aversion to inequality. When λ is zero,
individuals do not care about inequality of net income when they vote.
Net income of individual type i is (1 − t)yi + b and substituting for yi
from (8) gives:
zi =( 1− β
0)(wi(1 − t)+b) (26)
Arithmetic mean net income is therefore z =( 1− β
0)(w(1 − t)+b). The




z = E(zi − z)
2











12This implies, for example, that high wage individuals do not moderate their labour
supply in order to reduce earnings inequality, but vote for some redistribution through
the tax system. This type of assumption is also made by Galasso (2003), although in his
approach individuals have a ‘self centred’ inequality aversion in that they are concerned
with their own position relative to some reference group. A self-centred approach is also
explored by Tyran and Sausgruber (2006).







give very similar results to those reported here.
11where σ2
w is the variance of the wage rate distribution. The coeﬃcient of
















where ηw = σw/w is the coeﬃcient variation of wages.
As in the case where λ =0 , individuals are assumed to vote on the
level of public good expenditure, with a ﬁxed tax rate, where the transfer
payment is determined by the government’s budget constraint. Therefore,
the policy space is unidimensional. Concavity of the indirect utility function
again guarantees the single-peakedness of preferences over G. The second






































The ﬁrst term is negative while the second term is positive, so that
d2Vi
dG2 is
unequivocally negative and the relationship between V and G is concave.
Consequently, all voters have single peak preferences over G and the median
voter is decisive. Hence, setting dVm/dG =0gives the majority voting



































Rearrangement of this expression gives:












































Equation (31) cannot be solved explicitly for Gm. However, some insight
into this can be obtained by recognising that Φ is same as the left hand side
of equation (19) above, when λ =0 , and is an increasing convex function
of G. In addition, (1 − α − β) − Ψ is decreasing in G. The proﬁles of Φ
and (1 − α − β) − Ψ are shown in Figure (1). The voting equilibrium for
λ =0is at point A in the ﬁgure, and for λ 6=0it is at point B. Clearly
a concern for inequality reduces the majority choice of G and increases the
transfer payment, b,f o raﬁxed t. In view of the nonlinearity of the ﬁrst-order
condition, it is useful to consider numerical examples of the variations in Gm.
These are reported in the following section.
5 Some Numerical Examples
This section provides numerical examples of the sensitivity of majority voting
outcomes to variations in selected parameters of the model, in particular the
tax rate, t,a n dt h er a t i oo ft h em e d i a nw a g et ot h ea r i t h m e t i cm e a nw a g e ,
wm/w. In addition to illustrating characteristics of the framework which
are not immediately obvious, it helps to motivate the speciﬁcation used for
empirical work in section 6 below.
The benchmark parameters are shown in Table 1. The preference para-
meters of α =0 .58 and β =0 .4 are chosen so that, with the benchmark tax
rate of t =0 .25, the proportion of time devoted to labour supply is sensible.
The arithmetic mean and median wage rate, expressed in annual terms, are
$70000 and $60000 respectively.14
14These are consistent with a lognormal distribution with mean and standard deviation
131-α-β 
0 | m G λ≠   0 | m G λ=
Φ




0 | m G λ≠   0 | m G λ=
Φ
(1 ) αβ −− − Ψ  
A
B
Figure 1: Equilibrium With and Without Inequality Aversion
Figure 2 shows indirect utility for variations in G, for a wide range of
wage rates, illustrating the concave and single-peaked nature of preferences
over G.







n 20 × 106
of logarithms of hourly wage rates of 2.87 and 0.56: these are similar to those for Australia.
Using the properties of the lognormal distribution the arithmetic mean and the median
hourly wage rate are 20.64 = exp(2.87+0.56/2) and 17.64 = exp(2.87):s e eA i t c h i s o na n d
Brown (1957). Furthermore, the maximum hours per day are set at 13 to obtain annual
equivalents.
14Figure 2: Indirect Utility Function
Figure 3: First Derivative of Indirect Utility Function wrt G
155.1 No Inequality Aversion
Consider ﬁrst the basic framework where voters do not care about inequal-
ity. Figure 3 shows the ﬁrst derivative of indirect utility with respect to
G. Figure 4 shows the relationship between bm/(Gm/n) and wm/w and, for
the other benchmark values. It illustrates the fact that the majority choice
of bm/(Gm/n) falls at a decreasing rate as inequality falls, that is as wm/w
increases towards unity.
Figure 4: Variation in bm/(Gm/n) with wm/¯ w
Figure 5 shows the variation in diﬀerent types of government expenditure
as the tax rate (considered here to be exogenous) increases. As shown in
the individual ﬁgures there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between
tax rate and transfer payment, total expenditure as well as bm/(Gm/n) .
Nevertheless, expenditure on public goods is linearly related to the tax rate:
this was established analytically above, where it was shown that ∂Gm/∂t is
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Tax rate
/( / ) mm bGn
Figure 5: Change in Tax Rate and Voting Equilibrium
5.2 Inequality Aversion
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the coeﬃcient variation of net in-
come and expenditure per capita on public goods, for the benchmark tax
rate and other parameters.15 As Gm/n increases, the amount available for
the transfer payment falls so that the tax and transfer system is less redis-
tributive. However, over the wide range of Gm/n examined, there is little
variation in ηz.
Although an analytical result is not available for the case where individ-
uals, when voting, care about inequality, numerical methods can be used to
solve the nonlinear equation for the majority voting outcome. Figures 7 and
8 show the median voter’s choice of expenditure on public goods and the
transfer payment, for alternative values of η and ξ.
As expected, raising the degree of inequality aversion reduces the majority
choice of the share of public good expenditure; however the reduction is quite
small over a wide range of ξ,e x c e p tf o rt h eh i g h e s tv a l u e so fλ.I nt h em o d e l ,
15The range of values here are realistic: for example, the coeﬃcient variation of wage
rates for Australia is approximately 0.2.
17Figure 6: Coeﬃcient of Variation of Net Income
Figure 7: Inequality aversion and Choice of Gm
18Figure 8: Inequality Aversion and Choice of Basic Income
Figure 9: Majority Choice of Composition of Expenditure
19labour supply incentive eﬀects impose a strong constraint on the ability to
redistribute income (that is, to raise b for a given tax rate, by reducing G).
Furthermore, the public good enters the utility function directly, so for the
median voter there is a clear cost of reducing inequality which cannot be
shifted to higher income earners (and hence higher taxpayers).
6 Data and Empirical Results
This section uses cross-sectional data for a sample of democracies to inves-
tigate the variation in the composition of expenditure, the ratio of transfer
payments to public good expenditure per capita. A major problem is raised
by the data requirements as it is possible only to obtain approximations to
the variables needed. The construction of the sample is described in subsec-
tion 6.1. The regression results are reported in subsection 6.2.
6.1 The Data
The ﬁrst question regarding the data concerns the countries to be included
in the analysis. The Polity IV (2004) dataset provides, for each country, an
index of democracy. This index varies between 0 and 10, the latter represent-
ing the highest level of democracy. It was decided to include those countries
with an index from 9 to 10 since the year 2000. These include parliamentary,
presidential or semi-presidential countries. The resulting 29 democratic coun-
tries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
I s r a e l ,I t a l y ,J a m a i c a ,L i t h u a n i a ,M a u r i tius, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and
Uruguay.
The model examined above is one in which voting on the level of expen-
diture on public goods, for a given tax rate, which results, via the budget
constraint, in a ratio of the transfer payment to public good expenditure per
person. In practice there is not always a clear distinction between pure pub-
lic and private goods. Using the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook
(2000-2006), public good expenditure was obtained as the sum of expendi-
20ture by governments on the following categories: defence, public order and
safety, economic aﬀairs, environmental protection, health, education and so-
cial protection. However, part of expenditure on education and health clearly
consists of publicly provided private goods rather than pure public goods.
The results reported below are for the case where one third of expenditure
on education and health is considered to be expenditure on public goods.
Experiments were carried out using diﬀerent proportions but these had little
eﬀect on the results.
Ad i ﬃculty also arises with the measurement of transfer payments. These
are modelled above as a basic income, but in practice countries vary in the
type of transfer payment system in operation. In the following empirical
analysis, transfers are measured as including: all unrequited non repayable
transfers on current account to private and public enterprises. Grants to for-
eign governments, international organizations, and other government units
are excluded. Again the data are taken from the Government Finance Sta-
tistics Yearbook (2000-2006).
Governments in this model ﬁnance the expenditure by income tax rev-
enue. In practice several taxes are used, with varying marginal rates. The
tax rate variable was constructed as the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. The
source for data on tax revenue and GDP are Government Finance Statis-
tics Yearbook (2000-2006) and WDI (2006) respectively. Tax revenue refers
to compulsory transfers to the central government for public purposes. It
contains taxes and social contributions. The group of taxes includes: tax
on income, proﬁt, capital gain; payroll and workforce; properties; good and
services; international trade and transactions and ‘other taxes’.
A central variable in the model is the ratio of the median wage to the
a v e r a g ew a g er a t e ,wm/w. Unfortunately it is not possible to obtain data on
wage rate distributions for the diﬀerent countries. It is necessary to use a
proxy, equal to the ratio of median to average income: Appendix B exam-
ines the relationship between this ratio for wage and earnings distributions,
suggesting that the latter can be a reasonable approximation for the ratio
of median to mean wage. Information on the distribution of income for the
countries in the sample was obtained from the WDI (2006) and World In-
21come Inequality Database (2007).16 Unfortunately the income concept varies
between countries. In some cases it is gross income while in others it is a
net income measure. This means that it was not possible to include in the
following regression analyses a separate variable for the inequality of net in-
come. However, the previous analysis has found that any independent eﬀect
of an aversion to inequality is likely to be small. Furthermore, the unit of
analysis varies between the individual and the household.
This information is in the form of the Gini index, so that a transforma-
tion between the Gini measure and the required ratio must be used. Suppose
incomes follow the lognormal distribution with mean and variance of loga-
rithms of μ and σ2 respectively. Hence the median and mean income are





Equation (34) shows that ratio of median to mean income for each country
depends only on the variance of logarithms of income. The latter can be



























where N−1 is the inverse function. The general form of the relationship
between the ratio of median to mean and the Gini measure is shown in
Figure 10.
For most countries, the Gini index is available only for selected years.
Hence, the average, from available data between 2000 and 2005, was used to
calculate the ratio of median to mean wage. Similarly, averages of government
expenditures and revenue over the same period were used.
16The latter database was used to obtain data for Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.
17The assumption of lognormality must be regarded as a convenient approximation
rather than an accurate description. For example, the two-parameter form implies that
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Gini 
Figure 10: Ratio of Median to Mean Wage Rate and Gini Coeﬃcient
T a b l e2 :A v e r a g e so fV a r i a b l e sf o rD i ﬀerent Country Groups
Group b/(G/n) wm/wt
Developed 0.62 0.85 0.39
Developing 0.71 0.78 0.28
Non-Former Communist 0.63 0.82 0.36
Former Communist 0.70 0.89 0.37
Non-Scandinavian 0.65 0.82 0.35
Scandinavian 0.57 0.90 0.45
23The countries listed above can be divided into various groups. First, de-
veloping economies include Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Hungary, Jamaica,
Lithuania, Mauritius and Uruguay. They belong to the group of middle-
income economies in the World development Indicator (WDI) classiﬁcation
which contains countries in which GNI per capita in 2005 was between $876
and $10,725. Second, there are the Scandinavian countries, including Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and former communist countries which
include Czech Republic, (East) Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia.
Table 2 presents arithmetic mean values of proxies used to measure the ratio
of beneﬁts to public good expenditure per person, the ratio of the median
to the arithmetic mean wage rate, and the tax rate. These diﬀerences and
the diﬀerent characteristics of those countries suggest that, in the regression
analysis, it may useful to introduce dummy variables.18
6.2 Regression Results
Despite the highly nonlinear nature of the expression for R = b/(G/n) in
equation (22), the numerical examples suggest that it is appropriate to regress
measures of R on the proxies for wm/w and t and their squares. Other
systematic diﬀerences between groups of democratic countries further suggest
the potential value of dummy variables.
The regression results are reported in Table 3.19 A quadratic relation-
ship between R = b/(G/n) and wm/w is obtained, but importantly the
above analysis suggests that ∂R/∂(wm/w) should be negative for all val-
ues of (wm/w) below 1.T h i s i s c o n ﬁrmed by the (unconstrained) results,
since ∂R/∂(wm/w)=−28.71+2(17.27)(wm/w). Hence it can be concluded
that a reduction in inequalit y ,t h a ti sa ni n c r e a s ei n(wm/w) towards 1,i s
associated with a reduction in the transfer payment relative to public good
18I tw o u l db eu s e f u lt oe x a m i n et h es p e c i ﬁcation using a sample of non-democratic
countries. This is not possible because of data limitations. However, from Government
Finance Statistics (2000-2006) comparable information on b/(G/n) for Bahrain, Bhutan,
China, Jordan, Kuwait and Oman were obtained. The average ratio was found to be 0.178,
which is signiﬁcantly lower that for the countries shown in Table 2.
19In order to allow for heteroskedasticity, the data were weighted by the reciprocal of
t h es q u a r eo fwm/w. However, this was found to have little eﬀect on the results.
24expenditure. But R falls at a decreasing rate: as the median approaches
the arithmetic mean, further reductions in inequality have a relatively small
eﬀect on the composition of expenditure.
This empirical ﬁnding, that a more redistributive policy (higher transfer
expenditure relative to public goods) is preferred by a majority of taxpayers
when inequality is higher, may be compared with the majority of studies
which ﬁnd — based on a model of voting over a linear tax — that higher
redistributive taxation is not consistently associated with higher inequality.20
The present approach instead takes the size of government, the tax rate, as
given and examines the resulting composition of expenditure.




Tax rate 14.29 2.18
Tax rate2 -15.47 -1.69
Developing 0.61 2.67




The results also show a quadratic proﬁle of R with respect to t. However,
for consistency with expections based on the model examined above, this
proﬁle should reach a maximum at a value of t well before t =1 .T h i s
property is also conﬁrmed. Transfer payments increase relative to public
good expenditure for tax increases in the lower range of tax rates and fall
for increases in the higher tax ranges. It can be seen that ∂R/∂t =1 4 .29 −
2(15.47)t so that the turning point occurs at a tax rate of t =0 .46.T r a n s f e r
payments are reduced relative to public good expenditure as a result of the
negative incentive eﬀects of further increases in the tax rate over the higher
ranges.
20See the survey by Borck (2007).
257 Conclusions
This paper has considered whether the ratio of transfer payments to expen-
diture on public goods in democracies can be explained as the outcome of
majority voting. A simple model was constructed in which individuals with
similar preferences, but diﬀering abilities and thus wages, vote for govern-
ment expenditure on a public good, for a given tax rate in a proportional
income tax. Hence voting is over only one dimension and a majority voting
equilibrium is shown to exist. The resulting level of a transfer payment, in
the form of a basic income, is given by the government’s budget constraint.
C o m p a r i s o n sw e r em a d eb e t w e e nt h ec a s ew h e r ev o t e r sa c te n t i r e l ys e l ﬁshly
and where they have an aversion to net income inequality, although their
private consumption and labour supply decisions are assumed to be made
independently of the income distribution.
In the case where voters do not care about the income distribution, an
explicit closed-form solution was found for the ratio of transfers to public
good expenditure per person, expressed in terms of the ratio of the median to
the arithmetic mean wage and the given tax rate. In view of the nonlinearity
of this relationship, and the diﬃculty of obtaining a solution when inequality
aversion is relevant, numerical examples were presented to illustrate the basic
properties of the models.
The numerical results provided useful insights into the various relation-
ships involved, suggesting that the ratio of transfers to public goods expen-
diture per person can be expressed as a quadratic function both of the ratio
of the median to the mean wage, and of the tax rate. Data for 29 democratic
countries were used to estimate a cross-sectional regression, which also in-
cluded dummy variables to allow for systematic diﬀerences between various
groups of countries. Data limitations meant that it was not possible to test
for a possible role for inequality aversion, although the numerical results dis-
played relatively little sensitivity. The empirical results conﬁrmed ap r i o r i
expectations. In particular, reductions in the skewness of the wage rate dis-
tribution (an increase in the ratio of the median wage to the arithmetic mean
wage) were found to be associated with reductions in transfer payments rela-
26tive to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases
in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in
the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level,
further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to
public goods. The results tentatively support the potential applicability of a
majority voting framework to the determination of the composition of gov-
ernment expenditure, compared with the determination of the absolute size
of government as reﬂected in the aggregate tax rate.
27Appendix A: Budget Constraint with Some
Non-workers
The analytical results derived above were simpliﬁed by the assumption that
all individuals work. This appendix considers the government budget con-





1−t, so that some individuals do not work. In this case
yi = wi(1 − β
0) −
bβ0






{wi (1 − β
0) − θ} (1)
where θ = bβ
0/(1 − t). Hence:
y = w(1 − β
0)H (wmin) (2)
where:21




{1 − F (wmin)} (3)
and F1 (wmin) and F (wmin) denote respectively the proportion of total wage
(rates) and the proportion of people with w<w min. These correspond to the
ordinate and abscissa of the Lorenz curve of wage rates at the point where
w = wmin. Hence setting these proportions equal to zero gives the simpler
result given earlier for average gross earnings.
In voting over the composition of expenditure for given t,t h ee ﬀect of
having some non-workers would be to reduce the median voter’s preferred
ratio of the social transfer to the public good per person, in view of the
greater incentive eﬀects of higher transfer payments. However, the basic
form of relationships would be unchanged.
21T h er o l eo ft h i st y p eo ff u n c t i o ni nt a xa n dt ransfer systems is examined in detail in
Creedy (1996).
28Appendix B: Earnings and Wage Rate Distri-
butions
It was mentioned above that data on wage rate distributions are not available
for the countries considered, so that a proxy variable based on the ratio of
median earnings to arithmetic mean earnings had to be used. This appendix
examines the relationship between the two distributions. As above, let y, w
and h denote earning, wage rate and hours of work respectively. Then:
y = wh (4)
and:
logy =l o gw +l o gh (5)
Then if μy and σ2








h +2 σwh (6)
and:
μy = μw + μh (7)
If w and h lognormally distributed, then y is also lognormally distributed
and the median and mean are:
ym =e x p ( μw + μh) (8)
y =e x p
µ




























































The question of importance is how ψ varies. If a regression requires the use
of log wm
w , the use of log
ym
y instead eﬀectively involves an omitted variable
equivalent to 1
2σ2
h+σwh.T h et e r mσ2
h can reasonably be assumed to be small
, so the question is whether the covariance σwh is likely to vary much between
countries. Unfortunately suitable data are not available.
Appendix C: Choice of The Tax Rate
The above analysis examined voting over the composition of expenditure,
the ratio of the basic income to public good expenditure per capita, on the
assumption that the income tax rate is given exogenously. It is also of interest
to consider a form of two-stage voting procedure in which individuals vote
on the income tax rate itself, on the assumption that they actually know the
conditional choice of expenditure composition for any tax rate. In this case
v o t i n gm a yb er e g a r d e da si n v o l v i n gj u s to n ed i m e n s i o n ,t h et a xr a t e ,a n d
the usual conditions apply under which a voting equilibrium exists.22
Under these conditions, indirect utility, as expressed in (12) as a function
of G and t,c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so ft by substituting for G using (20). This





















with G = n(1 − α − β){w + t(1 − β
0)(w − w)}.
The complexity of the resulting expression makes it diﬃcult to establish
the single-peakedness of preferences analytically; for example, diﬀerentiating
22In a broader framework, it would be desirable to allow the tax rate to depend also on
the need to ﬁnance other forms of expenditure. Even if these do not enter utility functions
and are imposed exogneously (both common assumptions), the need for a minimum rate
inﬂuences labour supply. Hence it would not be appropriate simply to add a minimum
rate to that discussed here. However, the general results obtained here would be expected
to apply in such a broader framework.
30V twice with respect to t produces a lengthy expression which does not
appear to have an unconditional sign. However, numerical analysis conﬁrms
that preferences are indeed single peaked. Figure (11) illustrates indirect
utility for individuals with diﬀerent wage rates. The other relevant variables
are the same as the benchmark values given above. Indirect utility is clearly
a concave function of t. Consequently, preferences over tax rate are single-
peaked and the median voter is the decisive voter.23
Figure 11: Indirect utility function and tax
In order to see the eﬀect of wage inequality on median voter’s choice of
tax rate, the relationship between tm and wm/¯ w is shown in ﬁgure (12). The
tax rate falls more rapidly as wm/w approaches 1, or inequality falls.
These results are obtained using the simplifying assumption that all in-
dividuals are working. An implication of allowing some workers to be at the
23Those with w above ¯ w prefer some expenditure on public goods, since they gain utility
from it, although they have no desire for redistribution via a transfer payment. They prefer
public goods to be ﬁnanced using t =0and a negative value of b; that is, they prefer a
regressive poll tax.
31Figure 12: Tax rate and inequality
corner solution where h =1has the eﬀect that, for some workers, prefer-
ences over the tax rate are likely to be double-peaked. Thus, over a higher
ranges of t, where individuals do not work, they would vote for higher rates,
since they would beneﬁt without having to pay taxes. This would continue
until the incentive eﬀects on remaining workers actually reduces the total
revenue available. However, in majority voting over the tax rate, Roberts
(1977)showed that an equilibrium exists so long as there is hierarchical ad-
herence (that is, an unchanged ranking of individuals), a condition which
applies in the present model.
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